Showing posts with label International Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label International Law. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 30, 2016

Alphabet Soup, Part III: The TTIP And the Future of American Labor

by B. Lana Guggenheim What is the TTIP? Have you heard of it? If you have, you’re likely mad as hell, and if you haven’t, you’ll soon understand why many are. One of many free trade deals, the TTIP has come under fire as the race for the White House heats up, with populist anger at obscure government deals that seem to harm the average American and benefit only a select few.

In the previous two articles, we examined two other free trade agreements, NAFTA and the TPP. The first article in the series covered the results of NAFTA, a free-trade agreement between the USA, Canada, and Mexico, established in 1994. The results of this trade deal were decidedly mixed, as new markets were opened and trade established, but American manufacturing moved to Mexico, costing thousands of jobs. Free trade agreements have now become a political lightning rod and litmus test, as anger over the sluggish economy continues. Even with this growing animosity however, another trade agreement, the TPP, or Trans-Pacific Partnership, was signed earlier this year.

The TPP was subject to numerous blistering criticisms and well publicized opposition, which were examined in detail in the second article in this series. But these arguments, while they did not prevent the signing of the TPP, are once again front and center among opposition for a trade deal still under negotiation: the TTIP, or the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. Whereas the TPP focused on Pacific area trade, the TTIP focuses on cross-Atlantic trade, particularly between Europe and the United States.


If passed, the TTIP would create the largest free-trade zone in the entire world, comprising of about half of all global production. President Obama once had hopes to finalize the deal before he left office, but he faces an uphill battle, and the issues are unlikely to be finalized before 2020. Just like with the TPP and NAFTA before it, this deal is marketed as creating opportunities for medium and small businesses; however, it is likely that the biggest winners will once again be the electronics, pharmaceutical, and chemical industries, industry giants that already enjoy the benefits of strong US-EU ties. Like with the TPP, Big Pharma benefits could result in extending patent protections for their drugs and pushing up the prices of medicines worldwide.


As with the TPP, ISDS (or, investor-state dispute settlement) is a major point of contention with the TTIP, and seen as a threat to the democracy of the EU, as many suspect it would give companies leverage to dictate policy to European governments. This is of particular concern to those worried about environmentally conscious legislation. The TTIP would eliminate all restrictions on natural gas exports, which means that the USA would have a larger market for oil derived from fracking, or hydraulic fracturing, itself a highly controversial procedure due to its potential environmental impacts. The TTIP also encourages self-regulation over mandatory energy efficiency legislation, and because it requires energy networks not to discriminate between energy sources, it would prevent legislators from prioritizing renewable energy sources. Some countries, like France, are already under fire from their public from trying to loosen up labor laws, and see the TTIP as a threat to their security on the job.


The United States might seem over-regulated (or at least over-supervisory) in comparison to some Pacific Rim countries, but the EU favors government oversight even more than the USA. EU states also often have stricter environmental laws in place than the United States. Still, some European governments are weak on climate action, such as Ireland, and those states are susceptible to corporate pressure under the TTIP, rather than EU pressure to crack down on harmful emissions and get in line with the Paris Climate Agreement.


Under the TTIP, European farmers would face stronger competition and lower prices, with American factory farms and and corporate food giants standing to gain. That might seem great to Americans, but Europeans aren’t too keen. The food fight is something that Europeans are actually really hung up on, much to American frustration. For example, France is upset about scrapping milk quotas, which could damage the country’s dairy sector, a key driver of its economy.  And while genetically modified crops are perfectly safe, citizens of the Euro-zone have a great deal of skepticism and suspicion towards them, and EU states are allowed to ban GMO cultivation as well as mandate labeling of GMO foods. Still, most of the animal feed in the EU is imported from the Americas, and is overwhelmingly comprised of genetically modified crops, but people seem to get antsier when that food goes to people too.


The EU is also much stricter on pesticides than the USA. The US law says that if you can’t prove it’s harmful, go ahead and sell the product, but the EU law is much stricter, demanding a risk assessment when there isn’t enough scientific data to clear up uncertainty. And this means that the EU and the US disagree about the maximum amount of pesticide residue allowed to be in food. The small, family-owned farms that still are present in Europe also contrast with America’s ranch model, especially as America makes use of growth hormones that are banned in the EU. (Meanwhile, America won’t import EU beef either, but that is due to the mad cow disease that ran across the continent in the 1990s.) Also at issue are the methods to prevent infection on meat and poultry (America washes its poultry meat in chlorinated water; the EU in hot water), and the lack of anything resembling the tightly-regulated “farm to fork” strategy in America. In short, folks are concerned that the TTIP would scrub these stricter food standards to bring the EU in line with American standards.


As it stands, there already are very few trade barriers between the US and Europe. Most tariffs are less than 3%. Therefore, many suspect the TTIP to be about increasing deregulation and opening up the European markets to corporations, and allowing them greater ability to roll back American or European rules that impact profits, but also help protect consumers, not just in the agricultural and food industry, but in digital privacy, and government oversight and regulation of financial institutions. The European Commission says the TTIP would boost the EU’s economy by over 120 billion dollars over 14 years, but Dean Baker, of the American think-tank Center for Economic Policy Research, says gains per household would be very modest (he compares it to finding a quarter on the street), and wider effects could result in net job gains or losses, depending on the model referenced. Indeed, he calls the aforementioned number a best case scenario, which is roughly equivalent to a month’s growth anyway.


There are also fears about the privatization of things that in Europe are state-administered social goods. In England, the debate rages about the future of the National Health Service under the TTIP. While some of these protests are a bit hysterical in tone, others raise points about the difficulty of reconciling such different systems, including the TTIP potentially forcing the NHS or other similar systems in other EU states to allow private US pharmaceutical firms to bid for lucrative contracts, thus paving the way for the privatization of the government health-care system “through the back door.” It also means privatization already undergone would potentially be impossible to restore to public hands, due to investor rights granted with ISDS. Fear of potentially being forced to pay compensation could forestall any rollback on privatization, even if the government wanted to. Parliament has promised however that just like CETA (a similar trade deal, but with Canada), there will be a provision that protects public utilities, like health-care, that can be a state monopoly or limited to a handful of private operators, thus avoiding this scenario. But many folks remain unconvinced, especially in UK, where there is a lot of public attachment to the NHS, as opposed to the rest of the EU, which usually has a more balanced mix of public and private options available. (Fears about the future of the NHS were deliberately stoked in the recent Brexit referendum as well, with pro-Leave folks explicitly stating that the NHS would be safe under their care but not in EU hands, and not post-TTIP hands, versus pro-Remain folks rejecting the notion that NHS would be threatened by the TTIP at all.) The European Commission has made available all negotiating texts, including lists of proposed carve-outs, which explicitly mentions protecting health services that receive government support in whole or in part. And back in March 2015, EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström and US Trade Representative Michael Froman addressed the issue, saying that no agreement between the US and EU would force anyone to privatize anything, or that once privatized, it can never be re-nationalized. Under the TTIP, if the UK or any other EU state breaks its contract with private healthcare suppliers, then yes, they can be sued. But that is pretty unlikely, and it’d be easier (and smarter) to simply let contracts expire and re-nationalize it after its conclusion anyway. (Despite the Brexit vote, the UK remains part of the EU until the exit negotiations conclude; as of the time of this writing, those negotiations hadn’t even been started.)


Privacy concerns are also a specter. The EU Parliament rejected ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) back in 2012 after a huge public backlash, as folks did not wish for internet providers to monitor their activity online, much less be required to do so. (Many countries in Europe did sign it, but have not ratified it or put it into effect, effectively killing it where it stood.) But it is feared that the TTIP would allow a “back-door” to get the core of those regulations on the books anyway, thus circumventing democracy. The combination of easing privacy laws, plus restricting public access to corporations’ data (especially pharmaceutical clinical trials) would be a disaster for the public, and a boon to corporations trying to sell them things.


And just like NAFTA allowed for manufacturing jobs to move with greater ease out of the USA to Mexico, the TTIP is likely to cause a bleeding of jobs from the EU to set up shop in the USA, where labor standards are lower and unions much weaker. That might be good news for Americans and the businesses that move here, but Europeans are understandably not too keen on losing their jobs.


In addition, the European community, like the Americans were with the TPP, isn’t thrilled with the secrecy shrouding the specifics of the TTIP, even if such is standard practice for these treaties. (This too is seen as anti-democratic behavior, and they kind of have a point, as many Americans felt the same about the TPP.) When there was a leak of sections of the TTIP draft back in May of this year, John Hilary, Executive Director of London-based charity War on Want, said that there was “no way” that TTIP could survive the leak. “The only way that the European Commission has managed to keep negotiations going so far is through complete secrecy as to the actual details of the deal under negotiation...This is surely the beginning of the end for this much hated deal.” That until recently, much of the publicly available text was only through leaks hasn’t endeared many campaigners to the deal, either. Still, even if the text isn’t that bad, the leak might embarrass EU member states away from signing on - an issue for France and Germany, as they are having national elections in 2017. Just after the leak, French premier Francois Hollande said no the TTIP, in part because he is deeply unpopular, and siding against the deal will earn him some points with the public.


President Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a joint conference about trade, immigration, and other issues in February 2016
And just like with the TPP, government officials who saw the document saw only sections, were under surveillance, and were not allowed to disclose what they read. And for German lawmakers (or any other non-native English speakers), penetrating the dense legal jargon is especially difficult. This has become a toxic issue in Germany, where Greenpeace activists unleashed their trove of draft documents, in a glass case near Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate - a wry commentary on government transparency, or lack thereof.


Globalization has in general come under fire and anti-establishment feeling is high, as it has failed to deliver on its promises of economic stability and growth, especially in the face of a still-present economic downturn. Such feelings are what prompted the Brexit vote, after all. And with the UK leaving the EU, there is one less vocal supporter for TTIP at the European table. Via the European Citizens’ Initiative, which enables EU citizens to call directly on the European Commission to propose legal actions, over 3 millions signatures against TTIP and CETA (which is basically a Canadian TTIP) were gathered within a year.


But the TTIP goes both ways; the USA has stricter financial and banking rules than most European states. Those restrictions were put in place after the financial crisis of 2008 in order to curb bankers’ powers and avoid a similar crisis in the future. Such restrictions were not put in place in the EU, and the UK might be seeking a lifting of these restrictions via the TTIP.

Could lawmakers or a future President actually gut existing trade deals? Trump said he would, but could he actually? Reversing trade policy won’t actually bring any jobs back, and companies tend to go where costs are cheapest anyway. This happened with America’s textile industry. Once a booming, core section of our economy, it moved overseas decades ago, decimating towns across the South - towns that have yet to recover. And that happened without NAFTA or any other trade deal. Trump says he wants to put huge tariffs on Mexican and Chinese imports (35% and 45% respectively), but that won’t make production move back. Those companies would just go somewhere else, likely Vietnam, or Indonesia, or Korea, as the standard of living is lower in these countries, and workers are therefore willing to do the same work for a lower wage. It’s just math.


Besides, slapping on such huge tariffs isn’t exactly easy; it requires an act of Congress, and would violate all the trade agreements the US has with other countries involved in the WTO, over 160 in all. And besides, if the US raises tariffs on imported goods, other countries would retaliate by raising theirs on our goods, which would hurt our economy to the tune of over a trillion dollars worth of exports. Preventing this from happening (or at least, making it very costly) is kind of the point of the WTO in the first place.


If trade is good for the country, why are the benefits not reaching Rust Belt towns, even decades on?  White collar jobs are doing better, and more goods are available for cheaper nation-wide, but blue-collar factory jobs are doing worse and worse - and trade deals exacerbate this. But advancements in technology, such as automation, and increases in productivity also slashed factory jobs - to the tune of about 80% of the total loss - and leaving no other opportunities for low-skilled workers. Another 20% lost was due to trade - and when you’re already hurting, this addition adds insult to injury. The US Chamber of Commerce argues that this automation is the primary engine of job loss, not trade deals, and that the elimination of tariffs and other obstacles boost market access for small and medium sized businesses that would otherwise be shut out of the global market.


“Onshoring,” a term for companies bringing manufacturing jobs back inside the USA, seems like it might help reverse this trend, but in truth, it offers little relief. Such moves, such as when GM opened a plant in Tennessee, or when Whirlpool was moving production from Mexico to the USA, only offer a trickle of new jobs. Most of these plants are in right-to-work states, which means laborers will have a very tough time unionizing, meaning they have much less job security than previous generations who worked in this field. Adjusted for inflation, they earn less too. Manufacturing and other blue-collar jobs are no longer a road to the middle class. There are no “good jobs” to be found here.   

In the end, you can’t stop trade, and attempts to do so would be disastrous. So what can be done? Focusing on the lack of labor protections would be a way to make sure those who do have work aren’t stuck in dead-end jobs that can’t even let them make ends meet.  Or tackling the lack of regulations that promote companies to boost their bottom line, regardless of the human cost. Or focusing on government policies that don’t provide enough avenues to re-employment for displaced workers. Expanding the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program would be a good start. This program helps workers pay for education and training to find new, better jobs, something that is critical for these blue-collar workers who are out of a job and out of options. However, funds for this program were sharply cut in the 1980s, and its current funding is entirely insufficient to address Americans’ current needs. President Obama and some economists also recommend expanded wage insurance, a sort of unemployment-wage that would offer laid-off workers a portion of their previous salary for a period of several years, which would ease a lot of the economic hardship suffered by older workers who are forced to take a deep pay cut, assuming they are lucky enough to find new employment at all.

Jeffrey E. Garten, Dean Emeritus of the Yale School of Management, states that the goal should not be to reverse trade policy, but that these policies should no longer stand alone. Rather, they must be accompanied by domestic policies that help workers thrive in the new environment, rather than leaving them to languish, as has been the case for the past decades. This can also include a progressive tax policy, better unemployment programs that increase the robustness of the social safety net for the chronically unemployed and underemployed, as well as better job training.

The current economic predicament has been decades in the making, and trade deals are only one complicated part of how we got here. Counterintuitively, these deals are good for America’s overall productivity and income, and boost many industries, while decimating already foundering manufacturing and factory jobs. The benefits of such trade deals are not shared equally. Combating this painful reality and helping America’s blue-collar workers is a lot more complicated than simply opting out of trade deals. Instead, we need a comprehensive economic reform, a series of policies that can start correcting the many factors that led us to abandon so many of our fellows in the first place. To not do so will only hurt us all.

Alphabet Soup, Part II: The TPP

by B. Lana Guggenheim The race for the White House has focused on the country’s many trade deals, including one that was recently passed: The Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP. Hillary Clinton once called it “the gold standard,” but has since been forced to walk that back due to public backlash. What’s the deal with these trade deals? Why do so many Americans hate them, and what can be done?

In a previous installment, we covered some of the contradictory results of free-trade agreements by examining NAFTA, a divisive piece of trade legislation. Ultimately, while NAFTA did benefit America’s bottom line, as it opened up Mexico’s markets to America’s products, it also enabled manufacturing to move to Mexico, thus further decimating the already-declining blue-collar job market. During this election season, NAFTA has served as a political lightning rod and litmus test both, and growing populist distrust and disgust about the nature of the economy and government shepherding thereof combined with a declining manufacturing sector has led to greater opposition to free-trade deals in general. Growing opposition has made it difficult to get other trade agreements passed, such as when CAFTA (the Central American Free Trade Agreement) was stalled in Congress in 2005 from lack of support.


But that wasn’t enough to scuttle the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership - though not for lack of trying. Many lawmakers on either side of the aisle publicly opposed going forward, including Senators Bernie Sanders, Kirsten Gillibrand, Elizabeth Warren, Barbara Boxer, and Mitch McConnell as well as Representatives Candice Miller, Dave Trott, Bill Shushter, Sander Levin, Paul D. Ryan, and others. Signed only in February this year, though not yet put into effect, the TPP is basically the new NAFTA (some even call it “NAFTA on steroids”). A total of 12 countries (USA, Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam, Chile, Brunei, Singapore, and New Zealand) would share in the perks, namely the reduction or elimination of tariffs on goods. These countries together account for 40% of the Global GDP. It is also similar to NAFTA in that yet more automotive manufacturing will be moved abroad, almost guaranteeing more job losses in that sector both in the USA and Canada, as it provides more trade and job increases in other sectors, as NAFTA has. And like NAFTA, one of the goals of this deal is to bring other countries in line with the (often higher) standards of the USA in labor laws, environmental protections, and even healthcare.


Like NAFTA, the TPP has come under fire for being environmentally unfriendly. The United States government says that the TPP is “the most robust enforceable environmental commitment of any trade agreement in history,” and is backed as such by the World Wildlife Fund, the Humane Society, the Wildlife Conservation Society, and others. The Peterson Institute for International Economics, a well known non-profit think tank focused on international economics, stated that the TPP is “the most environmentally friendly trade deal ever negotiated.” It is worth noting that the TPP is the first trade agreement to include prohibitions on harmful fishing practices. It also contains provisions about the preservation of wetlands, marine pollution, and logging.


However, other conservation groups, such as the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the World Wide Fund for Nature, level harsh criticisms at the TPP, saying that it would give more leverage to corporations to threaten the environment. Since the announcement of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (or SDGs for short, a series of aspirational goals spearheaded by the UN and shared by governments worldwide), in September 2015, many see the TPP as a mixed bag that promotes environmental health and economic growth in some factors, but inhibits it in others, especially where development and environmental goals may clash. What may be history’s most environmentally friendly trade deal to date does not necessarily ensure that the environment is adequately protected from the depredations of man.


In line with the goal of bringing other nations “up to speed” on transparency in government and better human rights standards, the TPP requires all signatories to join the UN Convention Against Corruption, criminalize bribery of public officials, and enforce anti-corruption laws, as well as prohibiting child and forced labor, protecting the right to collective bargaining (thus allowing unions to form, for example), and prohibiting employment discrimination (a particularly tricky thing to enforce, as it is very difficult to prove.) Expanded trade opportunities combined with strong protections for workers can help move people into the formal, wage-paying economy, and this in turn helps improve human rights conditions. President Obama points to Malaysia’s efforts on cracking down on human trafficking as an example. Malaysia began to comply with the TPP in June 2015, and since then has given trafficking victims better access to government shelters, transitional housing, and better restitution procedures, as well as taken steps to halt the human trafficking industry.


Still, both Malaysia and Vietnam, two of the nations participating in TPP, are lax in enforcing labor laws, including issues relating to minimum wage, hours of work, human trafficking, and collective bargaining. The Peterson Institute for International Economics asserts that the TPP has more labor rights protections than any previous agreement, but just like the environment, the best yet may still not be enough. Suspension of benefits of the TPP if countries do not comply may be enough of a “stick” to ensure cooperation, but it may not be - and only time will tell. Senator Bernie Sanders stated that for Americans to compete against Vietnam and Malaysia, with their lax enforcement of labor laws and 56 cents-an-hour minimum wage is neither fair, nor free trade, but a race to the bottom. Instead of bringing other countries in line with America’s labor laws, Sanders asserts the TPP will just succeed in moving more jobs offshore, undercutting worker rights, and challenging existing labor, environmental, and health and safety laws.
Another key section of the TPP is the protection of intellectual property, including trademarks, copyrights, and patents, all of which are of increased concern in an increasingly digital market. But some critics, like the Electronic Frontier Foundation, argue that these are excessive, and entrench controversial aspects of American copyright laws, which in turn restrict Congress’ ability to engage in domestic law reform, something that will doubtless become increasingly necessary considering the rapid pace of digital innovation. More disturbingly, strict sanctions and vague text about “misuse of trade secrets” might create new threats for journalists and whistleblowers at home and abroad.


More concerning is how intellectual property laws cover pharmaceuticals. Tightening patent laws allow corporations, especially the large pharmaceutical companies, to possibly gain unfair advantages. While some argue that the TPP would result in increased tech-transfers that would stimulate more innovation and drug launches in other countries, both economist Paul Krugman and Doctors Without Borders worry that the opposite might occur, and patent extensions might delay or scuttle the availability of affordable generic drugs, the access of which is critical to under-privileged communities both at home and abroad. Former US Labor Secretary Robert Reich raised concerns about how provisions for international tribunals can require corporations be reimbursed for lost revenue for another nation’s development of a generic version of a patented drug. However, the US government says that the TPP aligns with the Doha Declaration on Public Health, which allows developing countries to dodge patent rights in order to have better access to essential medicines, and pharmaceutical companies have criticized the TPP for having too lenient property protections.


Also controversial is the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which allows investors to sue foreign governments in cases of treaty violation. It’s meant to provide protections from discrimination abroad, denial of justice, expropriation of property, and other violations. While it can’t overturn local laws that violate the treaty, it gives a mechanism for groups to recoup losses that occur because of them. It does not, however, allow corporations to sue for “lost profits” only - they have to have resulted from a treaty breach. However, tobacco products are specifically excluded from the ISDS process, an exception carved out in response to the possibility of suing due to anti-smoking laws in various countries. But it might leave open the possibility of oil companies to sue governments that enact legislation to reduce carbon emissions, which is troubling. Granting such power to investors and corporations can result in hobbling governments and their judicial systems, including for measures meant to address public health, national security, and economic crisis legislation. But the US government challenges this assertion, noting that investment protections are a component of over 3000 trade agreements, most of which have a form of neutral arbitration - and the US is party to at least 50 of them, and of them, the TPP has more robust protections, including provisions to dismiss frivolous claims quickly, preventative measures against sham corporations from accessing investment protections, and arbitrations would be open to the public and allow input from non-parties. And the USA has faced only 13 ISDS cases, and never once lost a single one. According to the International Bar Association, states have won a higher percentage of ISDS cases than investors, one-third of all cases end in settlement, and only 8% of these proceedings are commenced by large multinational corporations in the first place. Once again, the Peterson Institute for International Economics says that the TPP’s ISDS provisions are a significant improvement over previous iterations, and that many of them are disliked by the business community, even as they are necessary for boosting investment. But yet again, the best yet may not be good enough for many.


Opinion is split on if the TPP will be of economic benefit, if only modestly so. The Peterson Institute for International Economics and the World Bank state that the TPP will lead to net positive outcomes for all parties, while others disagree, including some economists and a number of previously mentioned lawmakers - and many American citizens. Economists Peter A. Petri and Michael G. Plummer insist that the gains are likely to be evenly distributed, and that though some workers will need to change jobs, it will account for but a small fraction of expected job-churn in any given year. Economists David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson argue that TPP would give US companies a strong competitive advantage, and killing it won’t bring back factory work to America. Furthermore, it’d pressure China to raise their regulatory rules and standards to those of TPP members.


However, two economists from Tufts University, Jeronim Capaldo and Alex Izurieta, argue that Petri relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as lost jobs would be immediately replaced by openings in other industrial sectors, and Harvard economist Dani Rodrik agrees that Petri and Plummer assume greater market flexibility than actually exists, countering that potential gains and losses are not so easily calibrated. The Tufts University scholars project an American job loss of 450,000 jobs due to TPP, and 771,000 jobs lost worldwide in signatory countries total, including Japan, thus pressuring wages worldwide and increasing inequality. But not everyone agrees with their model either, and Rodrik says they do a poor job of explaining how their simulation actually works. Others contend that the Tufts study ignores potentially positive impacts of the TPP, including the emergence of structural change and innovation, the emergence of new industries, and the impact of lower barriers on international trade.

However, as Hillary Clinton asserted (or at least she used to before she walked back her support), there are geopolitical reasons to support TPP, even with its potentially adverse economic effects. Of all 12 countries included in this massive deal, China is excluded. The result? A potentially Pacific-wide decrease of dependence on Chinese trade, whilst increasing American influence on future developments for the global economy and allowing them to better compete against China. It also increases the likelihood that Japan kickstarts reforms needed to revive its economy (no more lost decades!). And combined with a potential addition of South Korea to the TPP later on (their interest in joining rose once Japan signed on), while it cannot slow the Chinese juggernaut, it might levy enough pressure on China to liberalize its economy. (Conversely, TPP’s failure would offer China greater opportunity to pursue alternative arrangements that could exclude the United States.) China isn’t particularly pleased about these measures, seeing them as a containment policy but since 2010, China’s attitude has swung from outright disdain to “wait and see,” with possible interest in future membership.


China has long been an economic policy hot button. China’s rise as a global player is unprecedented, and they are currently America’s top trading partner for goods. As it turns out, trade with China has had a concentrated, decidedly negative effect on specific labor sectors, mostly manufacturing. This may be partially due to some of China’s “dirty tricks” - undervaluing their currency to artificially make Chinese goods cheaper in the USA, and American goods more expensive in China, and China’s membership in the World Trade Organization making it difficult for the USA to retaliate. China’s economy is still state-controlled, and that means they can artificially set the value of their currency, unlike in the USA or the EU, which allows the market to determine the currency value. This means that things look more volatile on our end, but are a great deal more honest in representing their actual global purchasing power - something that a large, stable economy like China’s can afford to handle. Artificially manipulating their currency means the Chinese can make American goods more expensive in Chinese markets, and Chinese goods cheaper in American markets. It’s like imposing a trade tax without running into the international laws that forbid you to do so. Still, China suffers from this policy, as it has led to serious inflation at times. And in the past ten years, since the currency restructuring in 2005, the relative value of the yuan has risen over 30%, reflecting slow-but-steady economic reforms. Many American lawmakers state that if the Chinese ceased artificially devaluing their currency, they’d have to compete on a more even playing field, which would likely mean they would have to increase the quality and safety standards of their goods, which in the long run is good both for China and the rest of the world. To that end, some have criticized the TPP for its lack of provisions addressing currency manipulation, but such a provision would hinder US monetary policy. However, the IMF contends that since their reforms, China’s currency is now fairly valued, even as it still remains more-or-less pegged to the US dollar. China is in the midst of vacillating between conservative stability and more liberalizing reform, a process that is hard to control, and the result of which caused a huge tumble in the country’s stock markets earlier this year, and prompted them to close the trading market after a mere 29 minutes back in January.


Both President Obama and Republican nominee Donald Trump have raised the alarm about China, but on opposing sides regarding the value of the TPP. Both Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders promised to “stand up to China” and asserted that the trade deficit with China cost Americans “millions of jobs.” Obama argued that without TPP, “China will write the rules” for Asian trade, whereas Trump said it was a deal “designed for China to come in...through the back door and totally take advantage of everyone.” Both are wrong, in that this trade agreement isn’t about neutralizing an enemy, but about influencing China, ensuring a balance of power, and bringing China and other countries into a rules-based order predicated on trade.


In fact, it is impossible to “contain” China, neither in undercutting their growth or neutralizing their diplomatic ties. Rather, the US has in interest in the economic success of smaller, but strategically important states like Vietnam, not to bring them into a US-led bloc against China, but rather to prevent an over-dependence on the Chinese economy that would lead to a loss of independent diplomatic and political leverage, and thus preserve a balance of power.


This is particularly relevant regarding China’s recent tendency to force outcomes in maritime disputes using mercantile and paramilitary pressure. China’s efforts to control the South China Sea are older than the United States itself, but recent developments point to a worrisome trend of militarization in the area. China relies on something called “the nine-dash line,” a line drawn on a map by the Kuomintang government back in 40s, to justify their claims (the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949, and the PRC was established by the victorious Communists in the mainland.) The islands and atolls in this area are mostly uninhabited, but are the sites of many natural resources, including oil, fisheries, and mineral deposits. Among the various islands and atolls under dispute between China, Taiwan, Japan, Brunei, Vietnam, and the Philippines, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands feature prominently. Japan claims the Senkaku Islands pointing to treaties stretching back to the 19th Century, and America’s post-WWII decades-long occupation and administrative handover to Japan as proof of sovereignty. The US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty is especially seen as backing Japan’s sovereign claims. And to bolster its claims, Japan bought three of the five islands from a private owner, which incensed China and caused thousands to march in the streets in protest. China, calling them the Diaoyu Islands, claims them as wrongfully seized Chinese territory that was reverted back to Chinese ownership at the conclusion of Japan’s occupation of China at the end of WWII. Since then, as recently as 2013, China has measurably beefed up and unified its maritime agencies, seeking to match Japan’s Coast Guard, which is the most robust Coast Guard in the world. In turn, Japan has made moves to beef up its diplomatic reach, offering military aid for disaster relief training to East Timor and Cambodia, both traditionally allies of China. In May 2013, Japan announced it will provide patrol boats to the Philippine Coast Guard, which boost their ability to patrol the southern areas of the sea and contain China’s growing maritime presence. In November of 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone, stating that non-commercial flights that did not submit a flight plan as far out as the East China Sea, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, were liable to be subject to Chinese military actions. They also released their first Naval aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, into these troubled waters. Classified as a training vessel, it nonetheless ruffled a lot of feathers.


China has also reclaimed a lot of land around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, more than the acres reclaimed by all other regional claimants combined. China built up a lot of infrastructure on these man-made islands, including runways and loading piers, which can be used for military purposes . However, the UNCLOS (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) does not grant maritime rights on man-made islands, and has criticized China for harming the environment in what it sees as a blatant territorial expansion. Despite calls from the US to ease up, in February of this year, China deployed surface-to-air missiles on Woody Island, a land mass in the Paracel Island Chain, another group of disputed territory near Vietnam, and disputed between Vietnam, Taiwan, and China. China has a total of 8 military installations on 7 reefs in the Spratly Islands, including one barely 115 miles off the coast of the Philippines. This all was only done a mere two years after the US eased arms embargoes on Vietnam and signed a new defense pact with the Philippines, underscoring the American commitment to their  “pivot” in East Asian diplomatic focus. But in June of this year, an international tribunal at the Hague ruled in favor of Philippine claims in the region, resolving a claim filed by the Philippines in 2013, saying that China has no historic rights in most of the South China Sea, a ruling that China thoroughly rejects. This ruling is welcomed not by just the Phillipines, but Vietnam as well, which has long sought to internationalize this dispute to try to leverage international opinion against China’s military and economic regional superiority.  


China’s activities prevent their neighbors from developing oil and gas fields in disputed areas because Chinese pressure on multinationals means investors are reluctant to back these risky projects. In September of 2010, after Japan detained the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler near the Diaoyu/Senkakus, China blocked the shipment of rare earth minerals to Japan, which are a vital component of modern electronics. And soon after China clashed with the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (or West Philippines Sea, depending on which flag you wave), China blocked hundreds of containers of imported Philippine bananas from entering port, and soon after slowed inspections of other imported Philippine produce and stopped sending tour groups to the country. China claimed the rejected Philippine bananas were infested with pests, and that the tours to the Philippines were suspended due to safety concerns. And in 2012, for the first time in 45 years, the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) failed to reach agreement on the wording of a joint communique over whether or not to include a section that focused on China’s recent actions, even though China is an observer state and not a member, due to China’s pressure on Cambodia, the meeting’s chair. The message from this and their other actions was clear: China was willing to use its economic clout to bully its less powerful neighbors.  


This begs the question: Why is China doing all this?  It is likely to rally public support around China’s Communist Party in the face of economic downturn. Were it not for domestic pressure, it would make much more sense for China to bide its time, and trust in its growing military superiority and economic might to shift the region to its favor. But the price China pays for throwing its weight around, even if stopping shy of provoking conflict or trade disagreements, is that its neighbors are alienated, and willing to build closer ties to the United States. And the United States seeks to formalize this relationship via the TPP.


The TPP may even yet prove to be beneficial to China, as they need to engage in new reforms to avoid the “middle income trap” and set the stage for long-term growth. Trade deals like the TPP would create incentives for China to adhere to regional and global trade rules and even domestic economic and political liberalization. And that would be good not just for the US, but the entire world. Even China has considered the benefits of joining in the future.


Other criticisms about the TPP are less about the content, and more about how the deal was created and discussed in the first place. Republican nominee Donald Trump basically called the TPP too damn long, saying it’s “so complex that nobody’s read it.” To be fair, he’s got a point: the text of the deal is monstrously long and complex, and I doubt that any lawmaker has read the deal in its entirety, as it is literally over 5,000 pages long. However, text-heavy deals are probably unavoidable, as they increasingly tackle non-tariff trade barriers such as different standards and regulations between signatory states. The complexity of these trade deals is a sign of the times. Less easily explained away is the secrecy under which negotiations for the TPP were conducted - which is standard for many trade agreements. Drafts of the deal were made public not by government fiat, but WikiLeaks. Critics like Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, a consumer advocacy group, called for more open negotiations in 2012. And the American populace in general is very suspicious of secret negotiations, being mistrustful of government and government officials. (This populist sentiment also characterizes the rise of two so-called “government outsiders”, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders, though one has had truck with politicians on both sides of the aisle throughout his career, and the other has been a Senator since 2007, and in Congress longer than God, probably.)


But some lawmakers were also upset about their piecemeal and controlled access to the drafts of the TPP, including Oregon Senator Ron Wyden, who tried to pass a bill that would require disclosure of all TPP documents to all members of Congress (he failed), and Michael R. Wessel, former commissioner on the US Trade Deficit Review Commission, who said that advisers like himself were prohibited from publicly airing their criticism, that they were only able to read portions of the text under supervision, were often given access to summaries rather than the original text, and that information on secure, government-run websites didn’t contain up-to-date information. Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren opposed the TPP due to disproportionate influences by corporations and industry interests, saying it makes the deal inherently biased in their interests and against that of the common American people. But others say her language is biased and misleading, and that both labor and industry representatives are present in various committees, and that the latter is critical to provide much-needed expertise. However the committee system that reviews such agreements are still numerically dominated by industry representatives.   Ultimately, these arguments did not scuttle the TPP, as some had hoped. President Obama signed the agreement into law February 4, 2016. However, it has not been ratified, which means that it is not yet in effect. The President had hoped to sign one more free trade agreement before he left office, a hope that will not come to fruition: the TTIP, or Trans-Atlantic Trade and and Investment Partnership, a free trade agreement with the EU. In our next installment, we will look at the issues preventing a trade agreement with Europe, the USA's largest trading partner, and why the TPP succeeded while the TTIP was ultimately kicked down the road for years to come.

Click the link to check out Part 3 of our series on trade deals.